Long-Arm Statutes
Long-arm statutes are how a court reaches a defendant who is NOT present and did NOT consent.
4. Personal Jurisdiction: Long-Arm Statutes
State long-arm statutes serve as the basis for statutory jurisdiction when constitutionally permissible.
- Long-arm statutes allow courts to extend their jurisdiction to hear some claims against defendants who are not present within the court’s jurisdiction and who have not consented to the court’s jurisdiction.
- Attempts to exercise long-arm jurisdiction can raise difficult issues of constitutional law.
- When personal jurisdiction rests on neither presence nor consent, Due Process requires courts to consider the defendant’s contacts with the jurisdiction and whether those contacts make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable and fair.
- If the defendant’s actions in the state [or directed at the state] gave rise to the cause of action, then the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction on claims arising from those contacts is constitutional if exercising jurisdiction would not violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
- If the defendant’s actions in the state [or directed at the state] do not give rise to the cause of action, courts will decide whether the defendant’s contacts with the state are sufficiently related to the cause of action such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
- If the defendant has not acted within the state, engaged in conduct targeting the state, or consented to personal jurisdiction, then the exercise of personal jurisdiction may not be reasonable or fair under the Due Process clause. [The mere possibility that a seller’s product may end up in a state, for example, is not enough to satisfy the Due Process clause.]
- As noted in Concept 1 above, compliance with the Constitution is not sufficient to provide personal jurisdiction based on a defendant’s actions. A statute or rule must also confer that jurisdiction.
- Test-takers will not be asked to recall the text of particular long-arm statutes.
Long-arm statutes reach a defendant who is not present and did not consent, but only when the exercise is also constitutionally permissible. Both keys have to turn: a long-arm statute and Due Process.
Long-arm statutes are how a court reaches a defendant who is not present and did not consent. They are the statutory key from concept 1 for the reaching-out situation, and they only work when the exercise is also constitutionally permissible. So this is the concept where both keys really have to turn at once: a long-arm statute (the statutory side) and Due Process (the constitutional side). When jurisdiction rests on neither presence nor consent, Due Process makes the court look at the defendant's contacts with the state and ask whether exercising jurisdiction is reasonable and fair, measured against traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
There is a sliding relationship between the contacts and the claim.
- 1If the defendant's actions in the state, or directed at the state, gave rise to the claim, that is the easy case: specific jurisdiction on a claim arising from those contacts is constitutional so long as it would not offend fair play and substantial justice.
- 2If the defendant's in-state or state-directed actions did not give rise to the claim, the court asks a harder question: are the contacts sufficiently related to the claim that jurisdiction still does not offend fair play and substantial justice?
- 3If the defendant has not acted within the state, has not targeted the state, and has not consented, jurisdiction may not be reasonable or fair. The mere possibility that a seller's product might end up in the state is not enough.
Two structural points the outline assumes without printing them, and that you should rely on. First, in federal court the court borrows the forum state's long-arm statute, so the claim that 'a long-arm statute does not apply in federal court' is false. Second, even a constitutional exercise still needs the statute; satisfying Due Process is never enough by itself.
The claim that a long-arm statute does not apply in federal court is false. In federal court the court borrows the forum state's long-arm statute. And the mere possibility that a seller's product might end up in the state is not enough to satisfy Due Process.
"Reaching out needs both keys."
Long-arm = the statute that reaches an absent, non-consenting defendant, but it only works if Due Process is also satisfied.
the defendant's in-state or state-directed acts gave rise to the claim, specific jurisdiction is fine if it is not unfair
the acts did not give rise to the claim, ask if the contacts are sufficiently related and still fair
no in-state acts, no targeting, no consent, not fair, and a product merely possibly ending up in the state is not enough
Structural trap to kill: 'long-arm statutes do not apply in federal court'.
A federal court borrows the forum state's long-arm statute.
A custom furniture maker working in one state designs a chair, advertises it heavily to buyers in a second state, and ships several directly to customers there. One of those chairs collapses and injures a buyer in the second state, who sues the maker there. The maker was never present in the second state and never consented to its courts.
Suppose the maker only sold chairs in his own state and one was later resold and carried into the second state by a stranger, with no advertising or shipping directed there. The mere possibility that the product would end up in the second state is not enough to satisfy Due Process, so a long-arm reach would fail on the constitutional key.
An option asserting that long-arm statutes are state-court only, or that a federal court cannot use one.
A federal court borrows the forum state's long-arm statute, so long-arm jurisdiction is available in federal court (operating rule 6, structural sources-of-law frame).An option treating the statute alone as enough without Due Process, or Due Process alone as enough without the statute.
Reaching an absent, non-consenting defendant needs both a long-arm statute and a constitutional, reasonable-and-fair exercise.An option that grounds jurisdiction in the mere possibility or foreseeability that the defendant's product might end up in the state.
When the defendant did not act in or target the state, that mere possibility is not enough to satisfy Due Process.An option that misstates the relatedness step, for example denying specific jurisdiction even though the claim arose from the defendant's state-directed acts.
Where the in-state or state-directed acts gave rise to the claim, specific jurisdiction is the strong case, proper unless it offends fair play and substantial justice.a stem with a defendant who is not present and did not consent, plus facts about what the defendant did in or toward the forum (advertising there, shipping there, contracting there) or, on the weak side, a product that merely drifted into the state.
Run the contacts ladder.
Did the defendant's in-state or state-directed acts give rise to the claim?
If yes, specific jurisdiction is proper unless it would offend fair play and substantial justice.
If the acts did not give rise to the claim, ask whether the contacts are sufficiently related that jurisdiction is still fair.
If the defendant did not act in or target the state at all, jurisdiction is not fair, and a product merely possibly arriving there is not enough.
And remember the statute: even a fair, contacts-rich exercise still needs a long-arm statute, which a federal court borrows from the forum state.
A workshop owner who builds and sells specialty bicycles operates entirely in a western state. She advertised her bicycles to riders in an eastern state and shipped several there directly to buyers who had ordered them. One bicycle's frame cracked and injured an eastern-state buyer, who sued the owner in an eastern-state court. The owner was never present in the eastern state and never consented to its courts, but a long-arm statute authorizes the suit.
Is the eastern-state court's exercise of jurisdiction over the owner constitutionally permissible?
A small toolmaker sells its wrenches only to hardware stores in its home state and advertises nowhere else. A traveler bought one of the wrenches in that home state, carried it on a road trip to a distant state, and was injured there when it slipped. The injured traveler sued the toolmaker in the distant state, where the toolmaker has never sold, advertised, shipped, or done anything at all. The toolmaker argues the court there cannot reach it.
Is the distant state's exercise of jurisdiction over the toolmaker likely to satisfy Due Process?
A plaintiff sued an out-of-state engineering firm in federal court sitting in the plaintiff's state. The firm is not present in that state and did not consent to suit there, but it had directed substantial project work at the state, and the claim arose from that work. The firm's lawyer argued that long-arm statutes are a feature of state courts only and therefore have no role in a federal court.
Is the firm's lawyer correct that a long-arm statute has no role in the federal court here?
An accounting firm based in one state opened a branch office in a second state, where it served clients for years. A client from a third state, who never dealt with the second-state branch, sued the firm in the second state on a claim arising entirely from work the firm did in the third state. The firm is not present in the second state in a way that allows all claims, did not consent there, and a long-arm statute is the only possible basis for jurisdiction.
Under the long-arm analysis, what must the court decide to determine whether it may hear this claim?
A graphic designer who lives and works in one state was hired by mail and email by a client in a second state. The designer never traveled to the second state and never consented to its courts, but she completed the project for the second-state client, billed the client there, and the dispute is about that very project. The second-state court has a long-arm statute that authorizes the suit. The client sued the designer in the second state, and the designer responds that, because she never set foot there, the court cannot reach her.
Is the designer's argument that the court cannot reach her likely to succeed?