Proximate Cause
Cause in fact only asks whether the defendant's conduct was part of the chain that produced the harm.
9. Proximate Cause
The causation element of negligence also requires that the defendant's conduct be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. This means that liability is usually limited to foreseeable plaintiffs or foreseeable injuries. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM §§ 29-36 (2010); DAN B. DOBBS, ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 198-217 (2d ed.).
- Proximate cause is a policy determination that limits the scope of liability based primarily on concepts of foreseeability [and on judgments about the fairness of imposing liability on injuries that are too far removed in time, space, or other circumstances from the negligent conduct].
- The precise manner that injury occurs need not be foreseeable as long as some injury is foreseeable.
- An “intervening cause” is an action that occurs after the defendant's negligent act and contributes to the plaintiff's injury.
- Foreseeable intervening causes do not cut off a defendant's liability.
- Conversely, unforeseeable intervening causes usually eliminate the defendant's liability for lack of proximate cause. These unforeseeable intervening causes are called “superseding causes.”
Proximate cause is a policy limit on liability, drawn primarily by foreseeability. A foreseeable intervening cause keeps the defendant in the chain; an unforeseeable one is a superseding cause that cuts liability off.
Cause in fact only asks whether the defendant's conduct was part of the chain that produced the harm. Proximate cause asks a different question: even if the conduct factually caused the injury, is it fair to hold the defendant legally responsible for it? This is a policy line that the law draws primarily by asking whether the injury was foreseeable.
Two things have to be foreseeable in a general sense: the plaintiff (someone in the foreseeable zone of danger, not a bystander injured in a freak way far from the risk) and the type of injury (the general kind of harm the negligence threatened). What does not have to be foreseeable is the exact, step-by-step manner in which the injury unfolds; if the general kind of harm was foreseeable, the defendant does not escape liability just because the precise sequence was bizarre.
The other half of the concept deals with later events. An intervening cause is something that happens after the negligent act and adds to the harm. If that later event was itself foreseeable, it does not break the chain and the defendant stays on the hook. If the later event was unforeseeable, it becomes a superseding cause that cuts off liability. So the whole concept reduces to one word asked at two points: was the result foreseeable, and was the intervening event foreseeable?
Do not answer a proximate-cause call with the but-for cause-in-fact test, and do not demand that the precise manner of injury be foreseeable. It is enough that some injury of the general type, to a foreseeable plaintiff, was foreseeable.
Two foreseeables in, one not: foreseeable plaintiff and foreseeable type of harm are required; the foreseeable manner is not.
As long as some injury of the right kind was foreseeable, the weird path it took does not matter.
For later events, use the fish rule: a Foreseeable Intervening cause Stays in the chain; an unforeseeable one supersedes and cuts liability off.
Foreseeable keeps it; unforeseeable breaks it.
Superseding is just the label for an unforeseeable intervening cause.
A delivery company lets one of its drivers work a shift with bald, worn tires. On a wet road the driver cannot stop and rear-ends a stopped sedan, denting it and shaking up the sedan's driver, who is not badly hurt.
Moments after the minor collision, a second car coming up behind, traveling at a normal speed and keeping a normal lookout, fails to stop in time on the same wet road and strikes the stopped sedan again, this time injuring its driver's neck.
Suppose instead that, while the sedan sat dented, a small plane making an emergency landing on the highway crushed it.
Same negligence, two different later events, two different proximate-cause answers, and the hinge each time is foreseeability.
An option answers a proximate-cause call with the but-for or actual-cause test, for example 'but for the act she would not have been there' or 'the act was not an actual cause.'
But-for is the separate cause-in-fact element. Proximate cause is decided by foreseeability of the plaintiff, the harm, and any intervening event, not by factual linkage.An option insists that the precise manner or exact sequence of the injury be foreseeable before liability attaches.
The precise manner of injury need not be foreseeable; it is enough that some injury of the general type was foreseeable.An option uses an absolute: the defendant is liable for every consequence that follows, or any later act by another person always cuts off liability.
Liability is bounded by foreseeability, and a foreseeable intervening cause does not cut off liability, so both absolutes fail.An option flips the foreseeability switch, treating a clearly foreseeable intervening cause as superseding or treating an unforeseeable one as merely intervening.
The trigger is foreseeability of the intervening event: foreseeable keeps the defendant in the chain, unforeseeable supersedes and cuts liability off.The stem gives you a defendant who was already negligent and a factual link to the harm, then either (a) routes the injury through a strange or roundabout sequence, or (b) drops a second actor or event into the timeline after the negligence, and the call asks whether the defendant is the proximate (legal) cause.
The trigger words are "proximate cause," "legal cause," "foreseeable," "intervening," or "superseding." The instant you see a later actor or a bizarre path, ask the two foreseeability questions: was a plaintiff like this one and an injury of this general type foreseeable, and if there is a later event, was that event foreseeable?
Foreseeable keeps the defendant in; unforeseeable lets the defendant out.
A landscaper negligently stacked heavy paving stones in an unstable pile right at the edge of a busy sidewalk. The pile toppled toward the sidewalk. A pedestrian walking past on that sidewalk was struck by a falling stone and broke her foot. She sued the landscaper, who argued that the collapse was an accident and that he could not be the proximate cause of her injury.
Is the landscaper likely the proximate cause of the pedestrian's injury?
A grocer negligently let a freezer leak a slick of water across a back storeroom floor. A stock clerk slipped on the water and, as he fell, he knocked loose a wall-mounted fire extinguisher. The extinguisher tumbled out an open loading door and struck a delivery driver who was standing in the alley far from any wet floor, fracturing his arm. The driver sued the grocer.
Is the grocer likely the proximate cause of the delivery driver's arm injury?
A hardware store negligently sold a customer a can of paint thinner with a defective, loose cap. The customer set the can on the back seat of her car. On the drive home the can tipped over, the thinner spilled and its fumes filled the car, and when the customer braked hard at a light the fumes ignited from a spark, burning her hands. The store argued that no one could have predicted this exact chain of events.
Is the store's negligence likely the proximate cause of the customer's burns?
A nightclub negligently propped open an emergency exit so it would not relock, letting an intruder slip inside. During a crowded show the fire alarm sounded by accident, and as patrons rushed for the exits one panicked patron shoved another, who fell and broke her wrist. The injured patron sued the nightclub, which argued that the shove by a fellow patron, not the club, caused the injury.
Is the nightclub likely the proximate cause of the patron's wrist injury?
A contractor negligently left a shallow, unmarked trench across a quiet residential street. A homeowner stepped into the trench and twisted her ankle, a minor injury. While she sat at the curb resting the ankle, a small meteorite struck the parked car beside her, and flying debris cut her badly. She sued the contractor for the cuts, claiming the trench set the whole episode in motion.
Is the contractor likely the proximate cause of the homeowner's cuts from the debris?
A utility company negligently left a heavy manhole cover ajar over an open shaft on a city street, with no barrier around it. A bicyclist riding by at night did not see the gap, rode into it, and was thrown to the pavement, suffering a deep gash. An ambulance took him to a hospital, where a treating physician was careless in cleaning the wound and the gash became infected, lengthening his recovery. He sued the utility for the worsened condition.
Is the utility likely the proximate cause of the bicyclist's worsened condition?
A driver was negligent and a plaintiff was injured in a sequence of events that followed. A court must decide whether the driver's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. The parties dispute which principle governs that decision.
Which statement correctly describes the proximate-cause limitation?