Aiding and Abetting
Aiding and abetting lets Nevada convict a helper of the very same offense as the person who physically commits the crime.
10. Aiding and Abetting
Nevada imposes criminal liability on a person who “aids and abets” the commission of a crime. NRS 195.020.
- An accomplice, or aider and abettor, can be convicted of the same offense as the person who directly commits the crime.
- The mental state required for liability as an aider or abettor depends on the mental state requirement of the underlying offense. To be convicted of a specific intent crime, an aider or abettor “must have knowingly aided the other person with the intent that the other person commit the charged crime.” Sharma v. State, 118 Nev. 648, 655, 56 P.3d 868, 872 (2002).
- Nevada has rejected the more expansive “natural and probable consequences” doctrine adopted in some other jurisdictions. Id.
- To be convicted of a crime of recklessness or negligence, “an aider or abettor must act with awareness of the [other person’s] reckless or negligent conduct and with the intent to promote or further that conduct.” Desai for Desai v. State, 133 Nev. 339, 343, 398 P.3d 889, 893 (2017).
- Criminal Procedure
- The criminal procedure concepts tested on the Nevada FLE include protections provided
- by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
- The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments apply directly only to the federal government. The
- Supreme Court, however, has applied most protections in those amendments to state and
- local governments through its Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine. 1
- Test-takers do not need to recall the case citations included in this outline, but they should
- be familiar with the case names commonly used to designate some criminal procedure
- principles: Terry stops, Miranda warnings, and Batson challenges.
- The 10 concepts in this section of the outline appear as a single category.
Aiding and abetting lets Nevada convict a helper of the very same offense as the direct actor. The hard part is the mental state, and Nevada makes it follow the underlying crime rather than setting one fixed standard.
The accomplice and the direct actor stand on equal footing for the charge. You always start by asking what mental state the underlying offense requires, and then you match the accomplice's required state of mind to it.
- 1For a specific-intent crime, the aider must have knowingly aided the other person with the intent that the other person commit the charged crime. Knowing assistance is not enough by itself; the helper must actually want the crime to happen.
- 2For a crime of recklessness or negligence, the standard shifts to fit that lower mental state: the aider must act with awareness of the other person's reckless or negligent conduct and with the intent to promote or further that conduct.
Nevada has rejected the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine that some states use to extend a helper's liability to additional crimes that were a foreseeable byproduct of the one they helped with. So if a helper intends to assist crime A, and the principal goes on to commit crime B that was a foreseeable consequence of A, Nevada does not automatically make the helper liable for crime B on a foreseeability theory. The helper is liable for what they actually had the required mental state to aid, not for everything that foreseeably followed.
Same offense, matched mind: an aider can be convicted of the same crime as the direct actor, and the aider's required mental state matches the underlying offense.
Specific-intent crime: the aider must knowingly aid and intend that the other person commit the charged crime.
Knowing help alone is not enough.
Reckless/negligent crime: the aider must be aware of the reckless or negligent conduct and intend to promote or further it.
Nevada rejects natural-and-probable-consequences: a helper is not automatically on the hook for a foreseeable further crime they did not have the required intent to aid.
A man learns that his friend plans to rob a jewelry store, a specific-intent crime. Wanting the robbery to succeed, the man drives the friend to the store, waits in the car, and drives the friend away afterward. He is charged as an aider and abettor to the robbery.
He is liable for the robbery. Now change the facts: suppose that, during the robbery, the friend on his own decided to assault a bystander, something the man never intended to help with. Because Nevada has rejected the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine, the man is not automatically liable for that assault merely because it was a foreseeable byproduct of the robbery; he is liable only for the crime he actually had the intent to aid.
An option that convicts a helper of a specific-intent crime on knowing assistance alone, or that demands intent-to-cause-the-result for a recklessness or negligence crime.
Match the mental state to the crime: specific-intent crimes need knowing aid plus intent that the crime be committed; reckless or negligent crimes need awareness of that conduct plus intent to promote or further it.An option that extends the helper's liability to a further crime because it was a natural and probable, or foreseeable, consequence of the crime aided.
Nevada has rejected the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine; the helper is liable only for crimes aided with the required mental state.An option that frees the helper because the principal did the physical act, because the helper was absent, or that convicts on mere assistance without intent.
An aider can be convicted of the same offense as the direct actor, presence is not required, and actual assistance without the required intent is not enough.An absolute option, such as 'anyone present shares responsibility' or 'anyone who provides the means is an accomplice.'
Liability requires knowingly aiding with the mental state that matches the offense, not mere presence or mere provision of means.the stem hands you a helper, someone who drove, supplied, encouraged, or stood watch, alongside the person who actually committed the crime, and then asks what the helper is guilty of.
ask what mental state the underlying crime requires, then match it: for a specific-intent crime, did the helper knowingly aid with the intent that the crime be committed; for a reckless or negligent crime, was the helper aware of that conduct and intend to further it.
Watch for the trap where the principal commits an additional crime beyond the one helped with; because Nevada rejects natural-and-probable-consequences, the helper is not liable for that extra crime on foreseeability alone.
Any option that convicts on knowing help without intent, or that extends liability to a merely foreseeable further crime, is a distractor.
A woman knew that her coworker intended to break into the company office at night and steal cash from the safe, a specific-intent theft. Hoping the coworker would succeed and would later share the money with her, she gave him a copy of her office key and the alarm code. The coworker used them to enter and take the cash. The woman was charged as an aider and abettor to the theft.
Can the woman be convicted of the theft?
A man agreed to help a friend rob a bank and drove the getaway car, intending that the robbery succeed. While inside, the friend, acting entirely on his own and without any prior plan, pistol-whipped a teller who was slow to open a drawer, committing a separate battery. The driver never intended any violence and did not know the friend would harm anyone. The driver was charged not only with the robbery but also, on an aiding-and-abetting theory, with the battery on the teller.
Can the driver be convicted of the battery on the teller?
A man rode in the passenger seat while his friend drove far above the speed limit and wove recklessly through heavy traffic, and the man cheered the driver on and urged him to go faster the entire time. The driver lost control and killed a pedestrian, and the underlying offense charged was one based on the driver's recklessness. The man was charged as an aider and abettor, the prosecution showing he was aware of the reckless driving and intended to encourage and further it.
Can the man be convicted as an aider and abettor of the reckless offense?
A woman sold a quantity of ordinary tools to an acquaintance who, unknown to her, later used them to burglarize a warehouse, a specific-intent crime. She had no idea what he planned and simply made a routine sale, taking payment and thinking nothing more of it. After the burglary came to light, the prosecution charged her as an aider and abettor, arguing that her sale assisted the crime.
Can the woman be convicted of the burglary as an aider and abettor?
A man encouraged his friend to vandalize a rival's car and stood watch as the friend slashed the tires, intending all along that the vandalism be carried out. The friend, who was a minor, turned out to be too young to be held criminally responsible for his own conduct, and the charges against the friend were dropped on that basis. The prosecution nonetheless charged the man as an aider and abettor of the vandalism.
Can the man be convicted as an aider and abettor?