Batson Challenges
A Batson challenge is the objection a party raises when it suspects the other side is using its peremptory strikes to keep jurors off the panel because of race, ethnicity, or
19. Batson Challenges
The Equal Protection Clause forbids both the prosecution and defense from using peremptory challenges to intentionally exclude jurors based on their race, ethnicity, or gender. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
- The Batson rule applies to the exercise of peremptory juror challenges at a criminal trial.
- Batson restricts both the prosecution and the defense. Neither side may use peremptory challenges in a way that discriminates based on race, ethnicity, or gender.
- Batson challenges need not match the defendant’s demographic characteristics. E.g., a white defendant may object that the prosecution has intentionally excluded jurors of color.
- The Supreme Court has recognized the Batson rule only with respect to race, ethnicity, and gender. It is possible that the rule would apply to peremptory strikes based on religion, sexual orientation, age, or other characteristics, but the law is not yet clear on that.
- The basic framework for addressing a Batson challenge is: (1) The challenger presents evidence that supports an inference of intentional discrimination by the opposing party. (2) The opposing party has an opportunity to articulate permissible reasons for the pattern of challenges. (3) The trial judge decides whether the pattern of peremptory challenges constituted intentional discrimination.
- When articulating permissible reasons for the pattern of challenges, general statements (such as “based on their responses to questions”) won’t suffice.
- Test-takers need not know other details about the Batson process.
A Batson challenge objects, under the Equal Protection Clause, that the other side is using peremptory strikes to keep jurors off the panel because of race, ethnicity, or gender. It binds both sides, and the trial judge decides whether the pattern was intentional discrimination.
The single most important thing to fix in your mind is that Batson binds both sides. People instinctively picture the prosecution striking jurors, but the defense is equally restricted; neither party may use a peremptory challenge to exclude jurors on the basis of race, ethnicity, or gender. A second surprising point is that the objector does not have to share the trait of the excluded jurors: a white defendant has standing to complain that the prosecution struck jurors of color, because the harm runs to the excluded jurors and to the integrity of the system, not just to the defendant.
As for which traits are covered, the Supreme Court has recognized Batson for race, ethnicity, and gender, and the printed scope is careful to say the law is simply not yet clear whether it reaches religion, sexual orientation, age, or other characteristics, so you should not state with confidence that it does or does not.
- 1The challenger comes forward with evidence supporting an inference of intentional discrimination.
- 2The opposing party gets a chance to articulate permissible reasons for the pattern of strikes, and a vague, general statement such as based on their responses to questions will not suffice.
- 3The trial judge decides whether the pattern actually amounted to intentional discrimination, not mere statistical imbalance.
Do not assume only the prosecution is bound, or that the objector must share the struck juror's trait. Batson binds both sides, and a defendant has standing even when the excluded jurors do not share the defendant's demographic.
both sides, any objector, three traits, three steps, judge decides.
Batson binds the prosecution and the defense at a criminal trial; the objector need not share the struck juror's trait (a white defendant can object to striking jurors of color); the recognized traits are race, ethnicity, and gender only (religion, sexual orientation, and age are not yet clearly covered, so never say definitely yes or definitely no); the framework is challenger shows an inference, opponent articulates a permissible reason, and the judge decides intentional discrimination; a general reason like "based on their responses" will not suffice.
Throwaway-but-wrong: "only the prosecution is bound" and "the objector must share the trait."
At a criminal trial, the prosecution uses several of its peremptory challenges to strike jurors of color, and the defendant, who is white, objects under Batson. The prosecutor responds only that the strikes were based on the jurors' responses to questions during voir dire. Defense counsel asks the court to seat the struck jurors.
Because the prosecutor offered only a general, non-specific reason, the challenger's inference stands unrebutted, and the judge may find intentional discrimination.
An answer that binds only the prosecution, or frees the defense to strike on the basis of race, on the theory that equal protection restrains only the government.
Batson restricts both the prosecution and the defense; neither side may use peremptory challenges to discriminate by race, ethnicity, or gender.An answer that requires the objector to share the race, ethnicity, or gender of the struck jurors before raising a Batson challenge.
A Batson challenge need not match the defendant's demographic characteristics; a white defendant may object to the intentional exclusion of jurors of color.An absolute answer that says Batson clearly does, or clearly does not, apply to strikes based on religion, sexual orientation, or age.
The Court has recognized Batson only for race, ethnicity, and gender; the law is not yet clear as to the other traits, so neither absolute is correct.An answer that treats a general reason such as based on their responses to questions as enough at step two, or that moves the step-three decision to the jury, the appellate court, or the striking party.
A general statement will not suffice at step two; the opposing party must give a specific permissible reason, and the trial judge decides at step three.voir dire at a criminal trial, a party using peremptory challenges, and a pattern of strikes that lines up with race, ethnicity, or gender.
The moment you see strikes that track a protected trait, run the Batson checklist.
both sides are bound, so it does not matter whether the prosecution or the defense is doing the striking.
the objector need not share the struck jurors' trait, so a defendant of a different race or gender may still object.
ask whether the trait is one the Court has recognized (race, ethnicity, gender) versus one the law has not yet clearly resolved (religion, sexual orientation, age).
Then walk the three steps: the challenger shows evidence supporting an inference of intentional discrimination, the opponent must give a specific permissible reason because a general one will not suffice, and the trial judge decides whether the pattern was intentional discrimination.
Any answer that binds only the prosecution, requires a matching objector, treats a vague reason as enough, or moves the decision away from the judge is a distractor.
At a criminal trial, the defense uses several of its peremptory challenges to strike jurors of one race from the venire, and a clear pattern emerges that the defense is removing jurors of that race. The prosecutor objects, arguing that the defense is exercising its peremptory strikes in a discriminatory way. The defense responds that the rule against discriminatory strikes binds only the government and places no limit on a defendant's own peremptory challenges.
Is the defense correct that the rule does not restrict its peremptory challenges?
At a criminal trial, a white defendant watches the prosecutor use peremptory challenges to strike several Black jurors, leaving a pattern that suggests the strikes were based on race. Defense counsel raises a Batson objection. The prosecutor argues that the defendant cannot bring a Batson challenge because the defendant is not the same race as the struck jurors.
Is the defendant entitled to raise the Batson objection?
At a criminal trial, after the defense raises a Batson objection, the prosecutor offers only the explanation that the struck jurors were removed based on their responses to questions during voir dire, without identifying any specific response or reason. The defense argues that this explanation is too general to satisfy the prosecution's burden at the second step of the Batson framework.
Is the prosecutor's explanation sufficient at the second step of the Batson framework?
At a criminal trial, the challenger has come forward with evidence supporting an inference that the opposing party intentionally discriminated in its peremptory strikes, and the opposing party has offered reasons for the pattern of challenges. The parties dispute whether the strikes ultimately amounted to intentional discrimination and ask who resolves that question at the final step of the Batson framework.
Who decides whether the pattern of peremptory challenges constituted intentional discrimination?
At a criminal trial, a party uses peremptory challenges to strike jurors who share a particular religion, and the opposing party objects, arguing that Batson clearly forbids strikes on the basis of religion just as it forbids strikes based on race. The striking party responds that the Supreme Court has not yet clearly extended Batson beyond race, ethnicity, and gender.
Which statement best reflects the current scope of the Batson rule as to religion?